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Direct-Risk-Aversion:
Evidence from Risky Prospects Valued Below Their Worst Outcome

Uri Simonsohn
University of California, San Diego

Forthcoming in Psychological Science

Abstract
Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive either a
$50 or a $100 gift certificate with equal probability? This paper examines three mechanisms for
this recently documented “Uncertainty Effect” (UE): (i) awareness of the better outcome
devalues the worse one, (ii) instructions in the original demonstration of the UE were
misunderstood, and (iii) people exhibit direct-risk-aversion, that is, actual distaste for
uncertainty. Experiment 1 documents the UE in a design where participants in the certainty
condition were also aware of the better outcome, eliminating the first explanation. Experiment 2
shows that most participants understand the instruction and that the UE is not caused by the few
who do not. Overall, the UE is proven robust, large (prospects are valued at 66% the value of
their worst outcome) and widespread (at least 62% of participants exhibit it).

________________________
Author’s note:
This paper was originally titled ‘The Uncertainty Effect’: In Fact the Effect of Uncertainty. I thank Leif Nelson for
valuable comments on the first draft of this manuscript, and both Isabel Swinburn and Daniela Lejtneker for
efficient and professional support in the data collection process as managers of Wharton’s Behavioral Lab (the data
for this project were collected while the author was affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania).
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Why are people risk averse? This question has received considerable attention by
decision making researchers, both theoretical and empirical, going back at least to
Bernoulli (1738). Despite the great number of theories that have been proposed to explain risk
aversion, it is striking that the notion that people simply dislike uncertainty, that is, that
uncertainty itself influences utility, is not part of any mainstream theory.1
Widely accepted risk aversion theories, including Expected Utility and Prospect Theory,
arrive at risk aversion only indirectly, as a side-effect of how outcomes are valued and/or
probabilities judged. In Expected Utility Theory, for instance, people are risk averse because
they satiate from consumption and hence potential increases in wealth are valued less than
potential decreases.
Despite important conceptual differences between Expected Utility and Prospect Theory,
then, they share (together with all mainstream theories of risk aversion) the reliance on “indirectrisk-aversion.” Importantly, all such theories makes the following falsifiable prediction: an
individual cannot be so risk averse as to value a risky prospect less than the prospect’s worst
possible outcome.
A recent paper by (Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006, henceforth GLW), however, obtained
evidence that contradicted this consensual prediction. In several between participant studies they
find that people are willing to pay less, on average, for a binary lottery than they are willing to
pay for its worst outcome, a finding they coin the “Uncertainty Effect” (henceforth, UE). For
example, they find that people are willing to pay an average of $26 for a $50 gift certificate for
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A small theoretical literature has considered the possibility of direct utility from risk, primarily to account for
gambling (see e.g. Conlisk, 1993; Diecidue, Schmidt, & Wakker, 2004; Fishburn, 1980; Royden, Suppes, & Walsh,
1959).
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Barnes and Noble, but only $16 for a lottery that pays either a $50 or a $100 gift certificate with
equal probability.
Considering the potential importance of the findings by GLW, posing a direct challenge
to the overarching paradigm currently used to understand risk aversion, in this paper I set out to
distinguish among three possible causes behind them. The first and most interesting mechanism
that may have lead to GLW’s findings is that uncertainty enters directly into people’s utility
function, that people exhibit what I shall refer to as “direct-risk-aversion.” The other two, to be
discussed in some detail below, are (i) that awareness of the lotteries’ high value outcome
diminished the perceived value of the low-value one and hence of the lottery as a whole, and (ii)
that respondents erroneously believed the lottery could result in a payment of $0.
In all of the multiple demonstrations of the Uncertainty Effect by GLW, participants
evaluating lotteries were shown their two outcomes while those evaluating outcomes to be
received with certainty were shown just one. This means that the manipulation of uncertainty
was fully confounded with the number of outcomes presented to participants. As it turns out,
this could -independently of uncertainty- explain the Uncertainty Effect.
Abundant research has examined the differences between evaluations performed on
single vs. multiple items (e.g. Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Bazerman, Moore,
Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999; Hsee, 1996, 1998; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; List,
2002), and (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) for a review. Particularly relevant
in this “joint vs. separate evaluation” literature is the finding that the willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for low quality items drops when they are evaluated jointly with similar but superior ones. For
example, Hsee (1996) reports that participants were willing to pay $24 for a dictionary with
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10,000 words when they were evaluating just that dictionary, but only $19 if they were also
evaluating a dictionary with 20,000 words.
The fact that the lottery includes a similar yet superior outcome, therefore, may diminish
the perceived value of the worst outcome. This mechanism provides a plausible
uncertainty-independent explanation for the Uncertainty Effect. Some patterns in the data
obtained by GLW suggest that the use of separate evaluation influenced their results at least
somewhat. For example, the median WTP to receive $100 and $200 in a year was the same
amount: $50 (see table I in GLW); such inadequate sensitivity to changes on the quantity of the
good being evaluated is typical of separate (but not joint) evaluations.
The experiments presented in this paper eliminated this confound by asking participants
in the certainty condition to value both the low and the high value outcome, i.e. by conducting
joint evaluations in both conditions.
Another possible cause behind the findings of GLW is that the lottery descriptions they
employed did not unambiguously rule out a $0 payment. One of their lottery descriptions, for
instance, was “…a lottery that pays $50 or $100 with equal probability…” (GLW, pp.1304).
While the authors were referring to a lottery that would for certain pay one of these two
outcomes, their description is consistent with a lottery that could result in a payment of $0, such
as one paying $0 with 98% probability, and $50 or $100 each with 1% probability.2
The possibility that the findings by GLW were caused by participants’ misunderstanding
of the lottery has been put forward by two independent set of researchers, (Keren & Willemsen,
Forthcoming) and (Ortmann, Prokosheva, Rydval, & Hertwig, 2008). To address this potential
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In some experiments they used the description “A lottery ticket that gives you a 50 percent chance at a $50 gift
certificate, and a 50 percent chance at a $100 gift certificate”. This could be interpreted as consisting of two
independent 50:50 draws, one for $50 and one for $100, making a $0 (and a $150) outcome possible.
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explanation, Experiment 1 in this paper modified the lottery description to more definitely rule
out a $0 payment, and Experiment 2 included comprehension questions about the lottery.

EXPERIMENT 1 – THE UNCERTAINTY EFFECT WITH JOINT EVALUATION

The design of experiment 1 makes two notable modifications to those conducted by
GLW: participants in the certainty condition indicated their WTP for two rather than a single
outcome, and the lottery description was modified slightly, seeking to eliminate the possibility
that participants may believe a $0 payment is possible.

Method
Two hundred and seventy-nine participants, primarily University of Pennsylvania
undergraduates, answered hypothetical willingness-to-pay questions as part of a series of surveys
and experiments they completed in exchange of monetary payment at Wharton’s Behavioral Lab.
The experiment consisted of a 6x2 between participant design, where six conditions
presenting different pairs of low and high value items were crossed with whether participants
indicated their WTP for each of the two items (certainty condition) or for the corresponding
50:50 lottery (uncertainty condition). Each participant evaluated only one item-pair under one
elicitation mode.
The six item-pairs were constructed by combining gift certificates for Barnes and Noble
(for $50 or $100), gift certificates for Pod, a high-end Asian Fusion restaurant located near the
University of Pennsylvania (also for $50 or $100), and three-course meals, also at Pod, for either
2 or 4 people (see Table 1).
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It is fundamental that participants in the certainty condition are aware of both items
before indicating their WTP for the first one (otherwise the first elicitation would not be
performed under joint evaluation). This was accomplished with the following instructions:
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for two different items. In particular we will ask you
how much you would be willing to pay for <low-value-item> and for <high-value-item>.
If you could only buy the <low-value-item>, what is the highest amount of money you would pay for it?____
If you could only buy the <high-value-item>, what is the highest amount of money you would pay for it?____

As mentioned above, the lottery description was modified to reduce ambiguity as to the
possibility of a $0 payment. In particular, it stated:
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for a lottery ticket that will for sure pay one of two
possible rewards (both are equally likely).
It will either pay <low-value-item> or <high-value-item>.
What is the highest amount of money you would pay for this lottery?___

The study was part of a series of experiments completed by participants in individual
cubicles with personal computers. Participants were assigned sequentially into conditions based
on the order in which they signed-on to the experiment. Data was collected over several
experimental sessions with condition assignment being randomized within sessions.

Results
Table 1 summarizes the results for Experiment 1. The Uncertainty Effect is observed
both for the average and the median WTP for all six item-pairs. Four of the six differences in
means are statistically significant at the 5% level, while two are marginally not significant at the
10% level. Four of the six Wilcoxon tests are significant at the 5% level and the remaining two
are significant at the 10% level.
*** Table 1 ***
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The ratio between the WTP for the lottery and the WTP for the low value item gives us
an indication of how large the Uncertainty Effect is. The average ratio across the six item-pairs
for the WTP means is 65%, indicating that participants were willing to pay 2/3 as much for the
lotteries as they were willing to pay for their lowest possible outcome. The average ratio for the
median WTP is a striking 38%.
It is worth noting that estimates of the Uncertainty Effect arising from central-tendency
measures, such as mean or median valuation, are conservative. They are conservative because if
some participants do not exhibit direct-risk-aversion, they will value the lottery above its low
value outcome and hence cancel out, in central tendency measures, the low valuation of those
who do exhibit direct-risk-aversion. In fact, even if a substantial (and statistically significant)
share of participants exhibited the Uncertainty Effect, the average WTP for the lottery may be
higher than the average WTP for the low outcome, if just a few participants value the lottery
sufficiently above its low value outcome.
Although in Experiment 1 central tendency measures did exhibit the UE, it is
nevertheless worth assessing how widespread it is across participants. This calculation is not
entirely straightforward in the present setting because the design is between participants and
hence only one of the two relevant valuations are observed for any given participant (i.e., we
cannot simply count the number of participants giving a higher WTP for the low value item than
for the lottery). We can, nevertheless, learn quite a bit by comparing the distributions of
valuations across conditions.
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution of the WTP for the $50 Barnes and Noble gift
certificate and for the 50:50 lottery for a $50 or $100 gift certificate as a demonstration. The
figure shows -for instance- that for around 50% of participants the WTP for the lottery was less
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than $20, while not a single participant’s WTP was lower than $20 for the $50 gift certificate; in
other words, around half the participants valued the lottery less than the person who was willing
to pay the least for its worst outcome. This pattern suggests that the UE is quite prevalent, and
not driven by a few extreme responses.
Employing the distributions depicted in Figure 1 we can precisely estimate the share of
participants who exhibited the UE, if we assume that the relative ranking of valuations across
participants is constant across conditions, that is, if we assume that if a participant pays more for
the low value item than another participant does, then she would also pay more for the lottery.
This would mean that the person paying the most for the lottery is assumed to be the person
paying the most for the low value item, the one paying the second highest amount for the lottery
to be the second highest payer for the low-value item, and so on.
Under this assumption, the point at which both distributions cross is the share of people
who are wiling to pay less for the lottery than for the low-value item. In Figure 1 the cumulative
distributions cross at roughly 80%, suggesting that around 80% of participants exhibit the
Uncertainty Effect. The crossing point for the other five item-pairs ranges between 70% and
80% (corresponding figures available from the author’s website).
***Figure 1***
Considering that the assumption on which these estimates rest cannot be tested, I also
estimated an alternative which assesses the lowest possible share of participants exhibiting the
UE. To this end the matching of participants’ between conditions is done in a manner that
minimizes the total number of ‘violations’.
To illustrate the procedure imagine a situation where there were three participants per
condition, with the valuations of the lottery being $10, $20 & $30, and the valuations of the low
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value item being $15, $25 & 35. For expository purposes let’s begin again with the assumption
that the ranking of valuations is constant across conditions. Under such assumption 100% of
participants exhibit the UE (since the lowest, median and highest valuation of the lottery are
lower than the corresponding lowest, median and highest valuation of the low-value item).
In contrasts, the lowest possible share of participants exhibiting the UE is just 1/3. If the
participant paying $35 for the low-value outcome was the one paying $10 for the lottery, and the
ones paying $15 and $25 for the low-value outcome were willing to pay $20 & 30 for the lottery,
then only one participant would exhibit the UE.
I conducted analogous calculations for the distributions of valuations for each of the six
item-pairs. The lower bound on the share of participants exhibiting the UE ranged between 52%
and 70% across the six pairs, with an overall-mean of 62%.
In sum, if we assume that the ranking of valuations of the lottery and the low-value item
is the same across subjects between conditions, then the best estimate of the share of participants
exhibiting the UE is about 80%. If we are not willing to make such an assumption, we can place
the lower bound on such share at 62%.
The main findings from Experiment 1, then, are that the Uncertainty Effect: (i) is not
caused (at least exclusively) by the fact that the lottery contains a superior outcome which may
reduce the valuation of the low-value one, (ii) is large in magnitude, and (iii) is widespread
across participants.
Study 2 will further address the possibility that people value the binary lottery less than
its actual worst outcome not because of direct-risk-aversion, but because they incorrectly believe
that the lottery may result in a $0 payoff.
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EXPERIMENT 2 – DO PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTAND THE LOTTERY?

If participants in UE studies erroneously believe that, like in most lotteries, a $0 payoff is
possible, it would no longer be surprising that they would pay less for the lottery than for the low
value outcome. Working papers by Keren & Willemsen (2008) and by Ortmann et al. (2008)
propose this is all that’s behind the findings by GLW.
Both papers assess the impact of modifying instructions and/or the randomizing
procedure behind the lottery on the prevalence of the UE. They both find that these
modifications do (sometimes) attenuate and even eliminate the UE for the average valuation
(though recall the previous discussion regarding the limitations of inferences about the
Uncertainty Effect based on mean and median valuations). 3
Keren & Willemsen, also find that a substantial share of participants erroneously answer
a comprehension question about the lottery and that only for these participants is the UE
observed. In particular, they asked: “True/False: The lottery offered me, with 100% certainty, at
least 50 euros in Book certificates,” and found that only for the roughly 45% (on average across
experiments) of participants answering false was WTP for the lottery lower than the WTP for the
low value outcome. These results are consistent with the UE being driven by misunderstood
instructions rather than by a direct distaste for uncertainty.
Their design and analysis contain two potential problems, however, both are addressed
by Experiment 2 in this paper. The first is that their comprehension question may have itself
been difficult to comprehend by participants. The second is that the comprehension question
(and resulting participant exclusion) was performed only in the uncertainty condition, possibly
3

Keren and Willemsen emphasize that in their experiments they employed coin flips –an intuitive randomization
device- to describe the lotteries, but this is an unlikely explanation for the difference in results, as GLW also did (see
appendixes 2 and 4 in GLW).
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introducing bias by engaging in selective elimination of observations in only one of the two
conditions being compared. It is hence possible that, despite their findings, the UE is fully
caused by a direct distaste for uncertainty.
In light of this, Experiment 2 contains two alternative comprehension questions. In one
condition participants were directly asked to state the lowest possible payoff of the lottery,
providing a simple assessment of the share of participants who erroneously believed they could
earn less than what the lottery actually could pay. In the other condition participants were
instead asked the true/false question. In addition, in Experiment 2 all participants indicated their
WTP both for an item to be obtained with certainty and for a lottery. By comparing the WTP for
the sure-thing item across participants answering the comprehension questions correctly and
incorrectly, we can estimate the statistical bias introduced by dropping observations only from
the uncertainty condition.

Method
One hundred and ninety-six participants, primarily University of Pennsylvania
undergraduates, participated in this study as part of a series of surveys and experiments. The
experiment consisted of a simple two-condition between-participant design, where the
comprehension question was systematically manipulated between participants. All questions
were over hypothetical scenarios.
All participants begun by indicating their WTP, today, for $100 to be received in a year.
They then all indicated their WTP for a 50:50 lottery that paid either a $50 Barnes and Noble gift
certificate, or a $100 one (employing the lottery description from Experiment 1).
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Participants were then asked one of two comprehension questions. Half the participants
were asked: “True/False: The lottery from the previous question offered me, with 100%
certainty, at least $50 in Gift Certificates” while the other half were asked “What was the lowest
possible payment the lottery could pay?” and were presented with a multiple choice set of
answers that included values between $0 and $250 in gift certificates, in steps of $25.
Importantly, participants could no longer see the lottery description when they were asked the
comprehension question.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the results from Experiment 2. Arguably the most important finding
is that of the 97 participants assigned to the multiple choice question, 92% (n=89) correctly
answered that $50 was the lowest possible payoff, and that not a single participant answered $0,
the most relevant value associated with misunderstanding. Two of the remaining 8 participants
answered $25, while the other six answered a number greater than $50. If anything, this
suggests that participants who misunderstand the lottery over-estimate its worst outcome; more
likely, rather than signaling lack of understanding of the lottery per-se, missing the
comprehension question signals not having taken the task seriously enough.
It is worth, nevertheless, to assess the extent to which participants such as these ones may
be behind the UE. Table 2 shows that the WTP for the lottery by the eight participants giving an
erroneous answer to the comprehension question was in fact much lower (M=15.5) than among
the 89 answering it correctly (M=31.1).
It is tempting to interpret this result as suggesting that misunderstood instructions do
indeed play a role in the UE. Such interpretation of the difference in WTP for the lottery,
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however, relies on the assumption that participants who answer the lottery question correctly and
incorrectly do not differ in their (reported) valuation of items to be received for certain.
This assumption, however, is contradicted by the results from Experiment 2. Participants
giving an incorrect answer to the comprehension question for the lottery had also for $100 to be
received in one year a dramatically lower WTP than did participants correctly answering the
comprehension question (M=15.74 vs. M=57.98). This exemplifies the problems associated with
comparing the conditional mean of participants in one treatment to the unconditional mean of
participants in another.
The lower panel of Table 2 repeats the analyses just presented for participants assigned to
the True/False question. A higher share of participants answered false to this comprehension
question (21 out of 99, or 21.2%) than the 8.2% that missed the multiple choice one, a
statistically significant difference Z = 2.56, p = .011. This is consistent with the proposition that
the True/False question was itself difficult to understand, especially considering that an answer
of $50 (or above) to the multiple choice question is logically equivalent to answering true for the
True/False question.
As was the case for the multiple choice question, participants erroneously answering the
True/False question gave a lower median response for the WTP for $100 in a year than did
participants correctly answering the comprehension question (medians of $30 and $50
respectively). The mean WTPs do not show this pattern ($52.43 and $47.38 respectively); this is
driven by two participants who answered false and gave a WTP of $200 (again, for $100 in a
year). If only answers of $100 or less are considered (in both conditions), the same pattern is
present: average WTP for $100 in a year is lower among participants answering the true/false
question incorrectly (M = 33.11) than those answering correctly (M = 45.34).
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Experiment 2, in sum, suggests that the mechanism behind the Uncertainty Effect is not
the erroneous belief that lotteries may pay a counterfactually low outcome. It also highlights the
importance of the conducting symmetric comprehension checks across conditions in order to
avoid statistical bias caused by, for example, eliminating participants who do not take the task
seriously only from one condition.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from this paper suggest that the Uncertainty Effect, valuing a risky prospect
below the value of its worst possible outcome, occurs as the consequence of people exhibiting
what I have referred to as “direct-risk-aversion”, that is, risk aversion which does not arise
indirectly as a consequence of how people value outcomes or weight probabilities, but instead,
directly from a literal distaste for uncertainty.
Importantly, the Uncertainty Effect is found to be quite large, with the average valuation
of a lottery over two outcomes being just 65% of the average valuation of its lowest outcome,
and widespread, with a lower bound on the percentage of participants exhibiting it being 62%.
While the notion of direct-risk-aversion has been considered before (within frameworks
regarding the “utility from gambling”, see footnote 1), it has not entered our mainstream
understanding of risk aversive behavior. The robustness, magnitude and widespread nature of
the Uncertainty Effect suggest this may be an important shortcoming in our current
understanding of risky choice.
Future work on direct-risk-aversion should strive to make progress on two different
directions. The first is in exploring its ability to account for real-world behaviors that are at odds
with existing theories of risk. The popularity of insurance for small-stakes risks, such as
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warranties for electronics, low deductibles or mail-insurance, is one promising possibility. Both
Expected Utility and Prospect Theory predict that people should not purchase insurance over
small stakes risks, and yet these seem to be extremely popular. Direct-risk-aversion provides a
plausible explanation.
The challenge, of course, is in avoiding the tautological argument of alluding to directrisk-aversion to ‘explain’ otherwise puzzling risk averse behavior. This leads to the second
direction in which future research on direct-risk-aversion could make important progress:
understanding what determines the perceived riskiness of, and hence aversion to a given
prospect.
It seems likely that factors that have previously thought to influence risky choice
independently, such as familiarity (Song & Schwarz, 2008; Weber, Siebenmorgen, & Weber,
2005), emotions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg,
1961; Fox & Tversky, 1995), for example, all ultimately influence it by affecting the subjective
sense of ‘riskiness’ of a prospect in turn influencing decisions via direct-risk-aversion. Research
exploring this and related issues could reshape our understanding of decision making under
uncertainty.
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Table 1. Experiment 1 - Willingness-to-pay for binary lotteries and for their respective outcomes (between subjects)
High Value outcome

Low Value outcome

Bookstore: $100 certificate

Bookstore: $50 certificate

Restaurant: $100 certificate

Bookstore: $100 certificate

Restaurant: $100 certificate

Restaurant: free meal for four

Restaurant: free meal for four

Bookstore: $50 certificate

Restaurant: $50 certificate

Restaurant: $50 certificate

Bookstore: $50 certificate

Restaurant: free meal for two

High
Outcome
mean

Low
Outcome

Lottery

Observations (N)
p-value of lottery Certainty Uncertainty
vs. low outcome Condition Condition
t-test/Wilcoxon

84.2

43.2

23.2

<.001

90

47

12.5

.005

67.6

34.5

25.7

.133

65

30

15

.065

57.8

33.7

23.9

.104

60

35

10

.019

78.5

40.8

25.1

.006

80

45

20

.005

mean

91.0

35.6

24.5

.044

median

100

40

12.5

.086

mean

97.7

46.9

30.7

.016

85

42.5

20

.001

median
mean
median
mean
median
mean
median

median

23

22

23

23

23

23

23

20

24

24

24

23

Table 2. Experiment 2 - Willingness-to-Pay by answer to comprehension questions
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for:

Receiving $100
in a year
Mean
Median

Lottery $50/$100 gift
certificate
Mean
Median

Comprehension Question:
Multiple choice
Correct (N=89)

57.98

50

31.13

25

Incorrect (N=8)

15.75

10

15.50

10

Total (N=97)

54.50

50

29.84

25

True/False
Correct (N=78)

47.38

50

28.24

25

Incorrect (N=21)

52.43

30

19.04

10

Total (N=99)

48.45

50

26.29

25
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Figure 1
Cumulative Distribution of Willingness-to-Pay
Item-pair: $50 / $100 Bookstore certificate

Cumulative Probability

1
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
0

20

40

60

Willingess-to-pay
$50 certificate

Lottery: $50 or $100 gift certificate
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